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Abstract 
This study examines empirically how bank regulations adopted in lender countries influence 
the characteristics of loan contracts, using a sample of 46,453 loans made by 278 large 
commercial banks around 39 countries, to borrowers in 83 countries, in the period from 1998 
to 2006. Our findings indicate that the stringency of capital regulations have an inverse U-
shaped relationship with priced risk characteristics (spread and maturity) of loan contracts. In 
addition, more powerful official supervision is associated with riskier loan contracts. Both 
official supervisory power and private monitoring work as substitutes to capital regulation to 
reduce the (priced) risk measures of loan contracts when capital stringency is low. For higher 
capital stringency, supervision and private monitoring complement capital regulation in 
reducing loan contracts risk measures. Finally, we found that a country’s degrees of legal 
enforcement and bank industry competition complement capital and private monitoring 
regulations to improve risk characteristics of loan contracts. The evidence highlights the 
importance of how bank lending practices are affected by bank regulations and their 
interactions with themselves and other institutional country factors. 
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I. Introduction 
The existence of banks as financial intermediaries and the functioning of the banking system 
are argued to be of great importance in determining a country’s economic growth and stability 
(Allen and Gale, 2000; Levine, 2006). More specifically, the credit channel plays a pivotal 
role in the transmission of the monetary policy, which is a basic element for achieving a 
sustained economic growth (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), as well as financial stability. 
Governments and national institutions all over the world are aware of the important role 
played by financial institutions and impose several regulations on the banking sector. More 
formally, the need for regulation is grounded on two basic reasons: first, the risk of a systemic 
crisis that would spread along all the economy; second, the inability of depositors to monitor 
banks (Santos, 2001). This study is interested in looking at how the functioning of credit 
markets is affected by bank regulations.  
The recent international financial crisis triggered a necessary and urgent debate on the 
restructuring of financial systems. The roles that prudential regulation on capital 
requirements, official supervision and market discipline should play in achieving the ultimate 
regulations’ purposes of guaranteeing financial stability and supporting economic growth are 
at the core of the discussion. Despite the current urgency of the issue, such discussion is 
already in place at least since the revision of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord, which led to a 
revised framework, the Basel II Capital Accord (Basel Committee, 2004). This accord 
establishes three bank regulatory pillars, representing capital requirements, supervisory 
review process, and market discipline. The effort devoted by Basel II in achieving bank 
regulatory convergence is not without criticisms, such as the high reliance that Basel II puts 
on supervisors to ask banks to hold capital above the minimum required. The critics1 see this 
reliance as an attempt to replace the market by supervisors or by the complicated formulae 
proposed by Pillar I. Also, the international standard status of Basel II and the widespread 
trend for its adoption make such an emphasis on supervision a challenge to the ability of 
developing countries in spending high resources on more sophisticated bank supervisory 
systems. Moreover, the emphasis on supervision implies the assumption that the public 
interest is to prevail, which could not be the case in weak institutional environments, where 
high supervisory discretion could lead to venal and systematic corruption. On the top of that, 
the current global financial crisis reveals serious problems with the mix between capital 
regulation, supervision and market discipline. The failure of that mix to avoid such a big crisis 
                                                 
1 For instance, see SFRC (1999), Rochet (2003), Kane (1997, 2002, 2004), Herring (2004). 
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is leading many officials and politicians to advocate for a movement towards more regulation 
and supervision, as well as the critics to Basel II are probably revaluating their views. 
Our study contributes to the debate on the efficiency of the three mentioned bank 
regulatory mechanisms by adding empirical evidence on their relative importance, the 
complementarities among them, as well as their interactions with the institutional 
environments they are inserted in. Our purpose, similarly to Barth et al (2006), is to achieve a 
better understanding of the forces influencing bank regulatory and supervisory choices and 
how these are translated into the credit policies adopted by financial institutions. We provide 
evidence of the effects of the aforementioned broad regulations on loan characteristics such as 
spread and maturity, using a large sample composed of syndicated loan contracts initiated by 
278 large commercial banks around 39 countries, to borrowers in 83 countries, in the period 
from 1998 to 2006. 
The main results indicate that the stringency of capital regulations have an inverse U-
shaped relationship with the priced risk measures of loan contracts. Regarding bank 
supervision, we find that official supervisory power is associated with riskier loan contracts. 
Both official supervisory power and private monitoring interact negatively with capital 
stringency to reduce risk term of loans (decrease spread and increase maturity). Given the 
nonlinear relationships between capital stringency and risk measures (inverse U-shaped with 
spread and direct U-shaped with maturity) we found that official supervisory power and 
private monitoring interact differently with capital stringency to influence risk measures of 
loan contracts, depending on different levels of capital stringency. For low levels of the latter, 
both supervisory power and private monitoring are substitutes to capital stringency when 
reducing the risk measures of loans. For high levels of capital stringency, supervisory power 
and private monitoring are complements to capital to reduce the risk terms of loans. Evidence 
on interactions between regulations and other country-level factors points that capital 
stringency decreases priced risk loan characteristics (decreases spread and increases maturity) 
especially in countries with high levels of legal enforcement, financial development and 
competition.  
The reminder of the article is structured as follows. Section II describes the related 
literature and empirical hypotheses to be tested. Section III describes the sample and variables 
used to conduct our empirical analyses. Methodology and results are presented in Section IV. 
The final section of the article presents the main conclusions of this research and offers a 
discussion of the significance of our results.  
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II. Related Literature 
The purpose of this empirical study is twofold: (i) to investigate the individual effects of bank 
regulations regarding capital requirements, supervisory power and private monitoring of 
banks on the characteristics of loan contracts, and (ii) to examine possible interactions 
between these three broad bank regulations and other institutional country mechanisms 
affecting the characteristics of loans. Accordingly, in this section we first briefly review the 
main theories on the separate influence of the three bank regulations on bank lending. Then, 
we present the theoretical arguments that point to possible interactions, substitutability, 
complementarities, and trade-offs between those regulations themselves and other 
mechanisms affecting bank lending, such as competition in the bank industry and country 
legal and financial systems development. We then concentrate on the empirical related 
literature. Finally, we propose the empirical hypotheses to be tested in our analysis. 
 
Bank Capital Regulation 
Despite the lack of consensus on whether and how banks need to be regulated, two 
justifications for regulating banks are often presented: the risk of a systemic crisis and the 
inability of depositors to monitor banks (Santos, 2001). The use of a deposit insurance scheme 
by governments is probably the most adopted proposal to avoid bank runs. Although very 
successful in protecting banks from runs, deposit insurance is not without a cost, as it implies 
moral hazard on the part of banks. That is because the deposit insurance provider bears the 
risk to protect depositors from losses, which inhibits depositors’ incentive to monitor banks. 
The consequence is an increase in the risk taking incentives of banks. If the insurance 
premium is not fairly priced, the risk taking incentives are even higher, as the full cost of risk 
is not internalized by the bank. Such risk-shifting incentive cannot be removed by charging 
fairly priced insurance premiums given that information asymmetry makes them impossible 
to be computed (Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1992), or undesirable from a welfare point of 
view (Freixas and Rochet, 1995). In this context, bank capital regulation arises as a 
mechanism to prevent bank failures and their potential externalities, by influencing bank risk 
taking. Nevertheless, theoretical research on the effects of capital regulations on bank 
performance, risk and stability has produced contradictory results2. With respect to this 
research, a conclusion of VanHoose (2006) states that “the intellectual foundation for bank 
                                                 
2 Santos (2001) and VanHoose (2006) provide comprehensive reviews of the theoretical literature on the 
effects of bank capital regulation on the risk-taking behaviour and solvency of banks. 
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capital regulation in general and for the proposed Basel II system specifically is not 
particularly strong. Instead of expanding the scope and complexity of the current system of 
capital regulation, it may be time to contemplate alternative approaches to bolstering the 
safety and soundness of the banking system.” We depart from VanHoose (2006)’s conclusion 
as a motivation to undertake this empirical research using a more comprehensive scope of 
bank regulation. 
The empirical evidence of the effects of capital regulation on bank lending is not 
consensual. For instance, different analyses of the credit crunch occurred in the United States 
in the early 1990s produced contrasting results. Some studies conclude that the introduction of 
capital requirements resulted in a reduction in loan supply, as a consequence of increase in 
capital ratios. Peek and Rosengren (1995a, 1995b) conclude that a decrease in loan supply 
induced by capital regulation, together with lower loan demand caused the decline in lending. 
Similar evidence is offered by Brinkmann and Horvitz (1995), Furlong (1992), Haubrich and 
Wachtel (1993), Lown and Peristiani (1996) and Hiuri et al. (2002). The contrasting evidence 
comes from Berger and Udell (1994), who attribute the credit crunch to a decline in loan 
demand and to other factors affecting loan supply. Wagster (1999) also concludes that other 
factors excluding capital regulation generated the credit crunch in the U.S. His study looks at 
other countries and find mixed evidence. The review of Jackson et al. (1999) examines many 
studies looking at the effects of capital regulation on capital ratios and reaches a mixed 
conclusion: in the short term, banks reduce lending to adjust to a tightened capital 
requirement, but do not maintain higher capital ratios in the mid term. Ashcraft (2001), and 
Flannery and Rangan (2004) find little evidence of the influence of U.S. capital regulations on 
capital ratios, respectively for the 1980s and more recent years.  
Concerning the effect of capital regulation on bank risk taking, the evidence is mixed 
as well, although the majority of studies point to an overall increase in risk after the 
implementation of the Basel I capital regulation framework. Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) find 
evidence in favour of risk reducing, but argue that the benefits are likely to be small, as most 
banks only slightly increase their capital ratios in response to capital regulations. On a sample 
of 98 U.S. bank holding companies in the 1975-1986 period, Furlong (1988) concludes that 
less risk-averse banks did not increase their asset risk in response to the introduction of capital 
regulation in the 1980s. Sheldon (1996) finds little evidence that Basel I capital regulation 
reduced asset risk on a cross-country sample in the 1987-1994 period. According to Jackson 
et al. (1999), a weakness of these two studies is that they do not control for many potential 
influences on bank risk-taking. Barth et al. (2004, 2006) minimize this problem by using a 
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sample of survey data across 107 countries, which allows them to include controls for the 
effects that different country regulatory policies may produce in the functioning of banking 
systems. Their results regarding whether capital regulation induces banks to take less risk are 
mixed. Although they find that more stringent capital requirements are related to fewer 
nonperforming loans, they do not find a relation between stringent capital regulations and the 
likelihood of a banking crisis.  
 
Bank Supervision 
Under the public interest view of regulation3, bank supervision arises as an activity 
capable of overcoming inherent failures of financial markets. In such approach to regulation, 
bank supervisors have the proper incentives, abilities and the necessary powers to accomplish 
their purposes of ensuring safety and soundness of the banking system (Barth et al., 2006). 
More specifically, supervision plays a role in reducing excessive bank risk-taking and 
promoting bank performance and stability. In this view, powerful and independent 
supervisory agencies are desirable, in order to avoid regulators suffering the political pressure 
of bankers. By contrast, the private interest view assumes that supervisors may use their 
power to serve either their own private interests or the ones of bankers and politicians. The 
consequences of powerful supervision in this view are poor bank performance and increased 
corruption. Research on bank supervision is scarce and limited to few empirical studies and to 
the discussion of conceptual issues underlying the Basel II’s proposal for the supervisory 
review process, known as Pillar II. By identifying implicit assumptions in some criticisms to 
the proposal of Pillar II (e.g. SFRC, 2001 and Hamalainen et al., 2003), VanHoose (2007) 
proposes a discussion on three conceptual issues underlying the appropriateness of the 
supervisory review process. The first issue refers to the question if rules are preferred over 
discretion in the supervisory process. It is raised by a common criticism that Pillar II proposal 
gives a lot of discretion to banks and supervisors, which could result in increased risk 
arbitrage and regulatory forbearance. The second issue is related to the first and asks how 
                                                 
3 There are two approaches underlying the research on regulation. The public interest approach to bank 
regulation thinking considers that regulation serves to the public interest of improving social welfare, by 
boosting economic development, preventing systemic crises and protecting depositors. This approach assumes 
the existence of market failures and that governments have the incentives and capabilities to overcome those 
failures. Opposed to that view, the private interest approach arises by viewing regulation as a product, subject to 
supply and demand forces. In this view, the private interests of the regulator and bankers prevail over the public 
interest, when determining bank regulations. It is the case for political and/or regulatory capture, which can lead 
to venal and systematic corruption. In practice, it is reasonable to view regulations to experience a dynamic 
process of responding to different incentives along the time, fluctuating between the extreme approaches (Kane, 
1997). See Barth et al. (2006, chapter 2) for a review on public and private interest approaches to regulation. 
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tough a policy rule really should be. There is theoretical disagreement whether prompt closing 
troubled banks is an optimal supervisory policy4. The third conceptual issue refers to whether 
international coordination of regulatory and supervisory rules is appropriate. The existent 
research on this issue is scarce5.  
Empirical evidence about the effects of supervision on bank lending and risk-taking is 
very limited. DeYoung et al. (2001) find that government supervisory examinations of large 
commercial banks produce new, value-relevant information. Although debt prices do not 
immediately reflect this information, the implied regulatory actions are priced by the market. 
Berger et al. (2000) compares the timeliness and accuracy of government assessments of bank 
condition against market evaluations. They find that supervisors and bond rating agencies 
both acquire some information that would help the other group forecast changes in bank 
condition. However, supervisory assessments and market indicators are not strongly 
interrelated. In addition, supervisory assessments are less accurate than either stock or bond 
market indicators in predicting future changes in performance. Both studies considered only 
large U.S. banking firms. By contrast, Barth et al. (2006) use a large sample of banks and 
countries, including emerging ones, to derive conclusions regarding the effectiveness of bank 
supervision. They find that empowering direct official supervision of banks does not boost 
bank development. 
 
Private Monitoring of Banks 
The reliance on the private monitoring of banks, a mechanism related to market 
discipline, is argued to be an alternative way to restrict excessive risk-taking behaviour of 
banks. From the private interest view of regulation, such reliance is argued to have a greater 
importance, as supervisors and regulators are assumed to succumb to bankers’ and politicians’ 
interests. Herring (2004) argues that “one of the principal merits of market discipline is that 
bank directors  and managers are faced with the burden of proving to the market that the bank 
is not taking excessive risks rather than subjecting officials to the burden of proving, in a 
review process, that the bank is taking excessive risks.” (pp. 365-366). Hamalainen et al. 
(2003) describe many potential social benefits of market discipline. Among the most 
important ones, we mention: first, the possible reduction in moral hazard resulting form 
deposit insurance; second, the threat of market discipline provides constant pressure on 
management to improve cost efficiency; third, if the market discipline process is faster than 
                                                 
4 See Sleet and Smith (2000), Kocherlakota and Shim (2005) and Shim (2006) 
5 See Holthausen and Rønde (2005) and Dell’Aricia and Marquez (2006) 
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regulatory actions, it may help regulators to screen “bad banks” from “good banks”, and 
promote the aforementioned Herring (2004)’s shift of the burden of proof. Among the 
potential negative effects of market discipline, the most important is the possibility of a bank 
run resulting from reactions of fund suppliers to widespread perceptions of higher failure 
probabilities6. Another undesirable effect is when market participants and regulators take 
misguided reactions as a consequence of persistent false market signals sent by fund 
suppliers. The market discipline concept applied to banking refers mainly to the reactions of 
fund suppliers – depositors, debt holders, shareholders – in order to induce banks to solve a 
perceived deterioration in bank solvency. These reactions may be the reduction in the amount 
that funds suppliers maintain in the bank, the maintenance of the same amount but at a higher 
rate of return, or the entire interruption of funds supply to the bank. Some conditions for fund 
suppliers to be able to engage in market monitoring are necessary, such as the existence of 
open and active markets capable to provide visibility of bank risk of insolvency to all fund 
suppliers, regulations promoting bank transparency and the release of correct information at 
appropriate times, and a no-bailout policy of depositors or banks (Flannery, 2001). Despite 
the variety of conclusions from the academic research regarding the relative effectiveness and 
desirability of relying on market discipline as a mechanism of bank regulation, VanHoose 
(2007) observes that Basel II has ignored the potentially useful signalling roles of market 
discipline. He warns that market discipline aspects of Basel II represent at best minimal 
innovations for most well-developed banking systems. However, he argues that countries with 
less developed banking systems are more likely to benefit from Basel II’s pillar III 
recommendations.  
Turning to the empirical evidence on market discipline in banking, the review of 
Flannery (1998) of mid 1990s research concludes for the existence of supporting evidence to 
a role for market discipline in supplementing regulatory supervision. This kind of evidence 
generally tests if suppliers of funds are able to perceive changes in banks’ risk profiles. In this 
regard, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) show that investors can rationally distinguish among 
risks taken by U.S. banks, by looking at the spreads between yields on subordinated debt and 
treasury bonds with the same maturities as indicators of capital adequacy and predictors of 
bank condition. It is especially true if subordinated debt is perceived as not being guaranteed 
by the government. Distinguin et al. (2006) find evidence that market-based indicators can 
                                                 
6 In the model of Chen and Hasan (2006), greater information transparency of banks tends to boost the 
likelihood of bank runs, unless bank informational disclosures clarify to depositors that the problem is 
idiosyncratic. 
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help predicting the degree of bank stress, as long as the bank does not heavily rely on 
uninsured deposits. Morgan and Stiroh (2001) examine market spreads on new bonds issued 
by U.S. banks and bank holding companies in primary markets to conclude that debt markets 
provide clear signals of asset risk differentials across banks. In evaluating subordinated-debt 
spreads as indicators of bank risk, Evanoff and Wall (2001) conclude that these are better 
predictors of regulatory ratings than capital ratios. 
 
Mix and interactions between mechanisms 
Although the many criticisms to the proposed approaches of Basel II, its general 
framework of structuring bank regulation and supervision in three pillars – risk-based capital 
requirements, supervisory review and market discipline - is widely consensual and accepted. 
The basic assumption of this framework is that the three pillars will reinforce each other and 
result in effective improvements for bank safety and soundness. In other words, they are 
assumed to be complements. An obvious implicit assumption is that the intended result may 
not be achieved unless all pillars are sufficiently well designed and structured (VanHoose, 
2007). Some authors, like Llewellyn and Mayes (2003), examined the conditions for market 
discipline and prompt corrective action to be complements. However, little research effort 
was dedicated to analyze joint interactions among the three regulatory mechanisms. Also, 
little effort was made by both the academic researchers and the Basel Committee to develop 
the second and third pillars, which raises concerns regarding the appropriateness of the 
proposals of Basel II in achieving its purposes. Next, we present the academic contributions to 
the issue of how the mechanisms of capital requirements, supervision and market discipline 
mix and interact, and the correspondent implications to bank behaviour. 
Substitutability 
Calem and Rob (1999) find a role for market discipline in reducing the risk-taking 
incentives of undercapitalized banks. Milne (2002) claims a role for ex post penalties imposed 
by supervisors in case capital requirements are not fulfilled. He argues that such a mechanism 
is likely to be more efficient in reducing risk-taking incentives than toughening capital 
requirements tied to asset risks. In their theory of bank capital based on the financial fragility 
as essential for banks to create liquidity, Diamond and Rajan (2000) also indicate a role for 
prompt corrective action, in the presence of deposit insurance. Dowd (2000) points that the 
problem of financial fragility introduced by Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) can be fully 
solved if banks keep a sufficient large capital cushion. Marini (2003) extends the analysis of 
Dowd (2000) to conclude that market-capitalized banks are also protected from insolvency 
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crisis. The arguments of Dowd and Marini offer the conclusion that market-capitalized levels 
of bank capital can substitute for both supervision and deposit insurance. 
Contingent complementarity 
Campbell et al. (1992) provide interesting results on the combination of capital 
requirements and monitoring in the optimal contract: first, as bank assets’ risk increases, it is 
optimal for depositors to increase both capital and monitoring, i.e., the mechanisms are 
complementary. Second, as incentive problems with monitors increase, depositors should 
increase capital requirements at the expense of monitoring, i.e., the mechanisms are 
substitutes. 
Complementarities 
 Some studies explicitly incorporate the mechanisms of the three pillars of Basel II. 
The dynamic model of Estrella (2004) finds that higher capital requirements only partially 
align bank behaviour to regulator’s objectives. Extra regulatory effort directed to less 
capitalized banks and market discipline alleviate the problem, although not sufficiently to 
attain the regulator’s first best desired outcome. As proposed by the author, a complete 
alignment to the regulator’s interest can be achieved if a regulatory commitment to an ex post 
penalty is applied. The comprehensive and ambitious study of Decamps et al. (2004) proposes 
a dynamic model based on continuous-time cash flows to examine interactions between the 
three pillars of Basel II. The authors interpret capital requirements as a closure threshold. 
They show that market discipline can be used to reduce the closure threshold, especially if 
there is a risk for regulatory forbearance. Regarding the second pillar, the authors suggest a 
mechanism of indirect market discipline, where supervisors can modulate the intensity of 
their interventions based on reliable signals given by market prices of the securities issued by 
banks. In his analysis of pillars II and III of Basel II, VanHoose (2007) argues that the market 
discipline pillar does not go far enough in the right direction, while the supervisory-process 
pillar goes too far in exactly the wrong direction. He suggests that “the market-discipline 
pillar would be significantly improved by requiring national regulators to begin studying the 
informational properties of market signals in bank debt markets for possible use in corrective-
action policies” (p. 32). 
Interaction between bank regulations and country-level governance 
 There are some considerations concerning the interaction of bank regulations with 
other country-level aspects related to the economic and legal environments where banks 
operate. As previously mentioned, the idea that high reliance on market discipline can 
substitute for regulatory and supervisory power emerges from the private interest view of 
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bank regulation. An important related issue is whether excessive reliance on market discipline 
is appropriate for countries with weak legal and financial systems, and poor accounting 
standards (Barth et al., 2006). The public interest view advocates for reliance on official 
supervisors to monitor the banking systems in weak institutional environments. It is argued 
that in such settings, great reliance on private monitoring leads to exploitation of small savers 
and consequently, to less bank development. The counter argument from the private interest 
view is that powerful supervisors are more likely to benefit private interests precisely in less 
institutionally developed countries. Caprio and Honohan (2004) go further and claim that for 
many reasons low developed countries may be better positioned to exercise market discipline: 
the lower complexity and the size of the banking and financial markets facilitate monitoring; 
the absence or low credibility of deposit insurance stimulates market monitoring; the presence 
of many foreign banks may result in more information disclosure. Barth et al. (2006) 
conclude that only empirical testing can resolve the debate. These authors offer a kind of 
reconciliation of bank supervision and market discipline when commenting the results of their 
empirical analysis: “[S]upervision works best when it facilitates market monitoring”. Our 
study also offers a contribution in respect of this. 
There is some evidence on the joint effects of bank regulations. Concerning the 1990s 
U.S. credit crunch, Furfine (2001) concludes that toughened supervision had a larger 
influence on banks’ balance sheet choices than explicit capital requirements. Barrios and 
Blanco (2003) used different models to assess the response of bank capital to market forces 
versus capital constraints. They concluded that the 76 Spanish commercial banks in their 
sample were unconstrained by capital regulation between 1985 and 1991, as the market-based 
model better fitted the data. Similarly, Beatty and Gron (2001) find that the introduction of 
risk-based capital regulations did not influence the behaviour of 438 U.S. bank holding 
companies between 1986 and 1995. 
We conclude this section with a brief description of some features of the empirical 
analysis we perform in this article. Our analysis builds on the empirical work of Barth et al 
(2006). However, besides having a much more limited scope than that study, our approach 
differs from theirs by using transaction-level data across countries, instead of taking 
essentially a country-level approach. Our study relies on the cross-country surveys on bank 
regulation and supervision performed by Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008) as its source of data 
on bank regulations. These surveys consist of hundreds of rules regarding bank regulation and 
supervision adopted by more than 100 countries around the world. To measure bank 
regulatory and supervisory policies, we borrow the approach proposed by those same authors 
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(Barth et al., 2006, chapter 4), which consists in using broader indices as empirical proxies 
rather than an “examine-every-rule” approach. They argue that the broader approach is 
statistically preferred, as many individual rules would render impossible the identification of 
their independent impact on bank operations. Furthermore, it is also preferred from a 
theoretical viewpoint, as there are only few broad concepts of bank regulation and 
supervision. Finally, the broader approach is specifically appropriate for this study, as our 
focus is to measure how three broad regulatory mechanisms influence some loan contracts 
features. These mechanisms mirror the Basel II’s three pillars framework, although our study 
is not making an assessment of the specific effectiveness of Basel II. Instead, our empirical 
approach relies on explanatory variables represented by the indices for Capital Requirements 
Stringency, Official Supervisory Power and Private Monitoring, suggested by Barth et al. 
(2006), to represent respectively bank capital regulations, supervisory power and market 
discipline. 
 
Empirical hypotheses  
We propose the following hypotheses to be tested in our sample. We take the public 
interest view to regulation when deriving them. Such approach implies that the hypotheses 
proposed are not necessarily the ones mainly expected by theory. Our purpose is not 
favouring the public interest view. On the contrary, it is to impose an arbitrary impartial 
discipline able to avoid driving the conclusions to any direction. We believe the evidence to 
be obtained is useful as a test of the theoretically well grounded hypotheses. It is also 
important in shedding a light on the weak or ambiguously theoretically grounded ones. 
From a public interest view, the regulations imposed on banks by countries are 
mechanisms capable to contain risk-taking behaviour of banks and, ultimately, to help 
assuring banks’ soundness, financial stability and economic growth. In a context of bank 
lending across a set of countries, we propose the following hypotheses to examine whether 
each of the bank regulations measures is associated with loan priced risk characteristics, 
represented by spread and maturity: 
 
H1: More stringent capital regulations reduce priced risk characteristics of loan 
contracts. Hence, they reduce loan spreads and increase loan maturities. 
 
H2: Higher official supervisory power reduces priced risk characteristics of loan 
contracts. Hence, it reduces loan spreads and increase loan maturities. 
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H3: More private monitoring on banks reduces priced risk characteristics of loan 
contracts. Hence, it reduces loan spreads and increase loan maturities. 
 
Provided that the influence of bank regulations on bank risk-taking behaviour is not a 
consensual issue, either from a theoretical viewpoint and the empirical evidence available, we 
consider checking the existence of nonlinear relationships between bank regulations and the 
risk characteristics of loan contracts.  
Furthermore, given the comprehensiveness of our dataset, we are able to extend our 
analysis by examining complementarities and interactions between both regulatory 
mechanisms themselves, and other country factors. For such, we rely on enriching the 
assessment of the previous hypotheses by introducing interaction terms between bank 
regulations themselves and between these and country factors such as the levels of bank 
competition, financial development and legal enforcement, as well as considering sub-
samples across these same country factors.   
Similarly to Barth et al (2006), one limitation of our study is to use bank regulations 
variables that are constructed based on a survey of statutory powers, which does not 
necessarily reflect how regulations work on the ground. Accordingly, our findings have to be 
analyzed with caution. In any case, by conducting econometric analyses on a novel sample 
that mergers country and transaction-level data, we believe we make a contribution to the 
literature on the evidence of how bank regulations influence lending practices of banks. 
 
 
III. Data description 
 The main source of our data is the LPC Reuters DealScan database, which provides 
detailed data on loans made all over the world by banks to large firms. Such loan level 
information includes many features of loan contracts, such as lender and borrower identities, 
dates of origination, purpose of loan, deal amounts, number of lenders, lender deal share, 
spreads, loan maturity, covenants, and borrower sector and ratings. To conduct our cross-
country study on bank regulations, we adopt the loan deal as the unit of analysis. At the same 
time, we are interested in the behaviour of banks. Therefore, our sample selection consisted in 
taking, whenever possible, the 15 largest commercial banks or banking holding companies in 
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terms of total assets, in 39 of the 49 countries included in the study of La Porta et al. (1998)7. 
Besides establishing a limit in the number of countries included in the study, we believe that 
such selection allows comparability with other cross-country studies, mainly related to the 
“law and finance” literature. Then, we collected information on all confirmed loan deals 
originated by those banks from 1998 to 2006. Such selection of period is motivated by the 
availability of bank regulations data, which consist of surveys made by the World Bank in the 
years 2000, 2003 and 2007 (Barth et al., 2001, 2006, 2008). We assume that country bank 
regulations reported by those surveys are in place for the following 3-year periods: 1998 to 
2000, 2001 to 2003 and 2004 to 2006. Hence, yearly bank regulations variables representing 
each country’s capital requirements stringency, official supervisory power and the level of 
private monitoring are added to the database. Similarly, other country-level variables are 
included, namely, the borrower country’s sovereign debt rating, the level of legal protection 
of creditors in borrower country, and proxies for lender country’s level of financial 
development, and borrower country’s economic development, economy size, and business 
cycle. Finally, bank-level characteristics are collected from the Bankscope database, and 
hand-matched with the loan deal level information. Raw data from DealScan was filtered to 
allow only confirmed loans, and to exclude loans made to firms in the financial and in the 
public sectors (first digit of SIC code equal to 6 or 9). These loans are dropped because the 
risks of firms in these sectors are argued to be very different from other firms, as they are 
likely to be government owned or government protected monopolies (Qian and Strahan, 
2007). Considering that some banks have no loans reported by DealScan, and that in fact less 
than 15 banks were included for some countries, we ended up with a sample of 46,453 loans 
originated by 278 banks around 39 countries, to borrowers distributed in 83 countries, during 
the period from 1998 and 2006. What follows is a description of the variables used in the 
analyses. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 The following variables represent the loan contract characteristics selected to be 
examined if they are affected by bank regulations, after controlling by other country-level, 
loan-level, lender-specific and borrower-specific characteristics: 
                                                 
7 New Zealand was excluded because most banks there are owned by Australian banks. Scarcity of data 
motivated the exclusion of Colombia, Ecuador, Kenya, Nigeria, Peru, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Zimbabwe. 
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- Spread: this variable corresponds to the “All-in Spread Drawn” information available 
for each deal in the DealScan database It consists of the base points in excess of the 
interbank market rate that is asked by lenders to borrowers in a deal. It also 
incorporates any charged fees associated to the loan. The Spread variable is assumed 
to reflect the risk that a lender prices to the borrower in a specific loan contract. 
- Log of Maturity: it is the logarithm of the maturity of a loan, expressed in number of 
months. As well as the Spread variable, Maturity is supposed to be a contract feature 
that reflects the risk priced by the lender to the borrower in a loan. 
 
Explanatory Variables  
 When studying the influence of bank regulations on loan contracts characteristics, we 
include four different sets of explanatory variables: country-level, lender-specific, borrower-
specific, and loan-level. The first set includes country-level variables reflecting: (1) some 
supply-side factors that may affect the availability of funds and the loan contracts 
characteristics, i.e., the conditions in which lenders want to extend loans to borrowers. The 
variables that represent the focus of this study, namely, the country-level bank regulations, are 
included in this set, as well as institutional variables at the lender country level such as 
financial development, legal enforcement and bank competition; (2) demand-side factors, 
such as the level of economic development, the business cycle, and sovereign credit ratings in 
borrowers’ countries. The second set consists of lender-specific characteristics, such as its 
size and leverage, which represent supply-side factors at the loan deal level, and likely 
influence loan contracts features. The third set of explanatory variables refers to borrower-
specific characteristics representing both demand-side and credit risk factors, essential to 
determine loan contracts characteristics. The fourth set of variables includes characteristics of 
the loans, other than those used as dependent variables, which also relate to demand-side and 
credit risk factors determining loan contract features. Additionally, year dummies are 
included as explanatory variables. Appendix I provides a detailed description of all 
explanatory variables, grouped in the described sets. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Basic descriptive statistics of the main variables is shown in Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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 Table 1 shows that the average spread of the deals is 188.8 basis points over LIBOR, 
while average maturity is 55.3 months (3.7 on a log scale). The mean deal amount is at 396 
millions of US dollars (the mean of the logarithm of deal amount is 18.8), with a high 
percentage of loans (63%) made to borrowers located in the same country as the lender. 
Regarding the variables describing banks’ characteristics, the average annual total assets of a 
bank are 204 billions of US dollars (the mean of the logarithm of bank total assets over the 
whole sample of deals is 20), while mean leverage is at 94%. The variables on regulatory 
measures indicate that Capital stringency has a mean value of 6.4 in a range between 2 and 
10, Official supervisory power has a mean value of 11.1, ranging from 4 to 14, and Private 
Monitoring has a mean value of 8.8 and ranges from 5 to 11. On the borrowers’ side, Table 1 
indicates that La Porta et al (1998).’s Creditor Rights index has a mean value of 1.5, ranging 
from 0 to 4 and that the Sovereign Rating Score of credit risk has a mean value of 2.4, ranging 
from 1 to 24. Finally, the set of macroeconomic variables related to a borrower country’s 
GDP indicates a wide dispersion of values among the borrowers’ countries.  
In general, our heterogeneous sample of countries offers high enough variability 
across the different variables for conducting an econometric analysis. Table 2 presents the 
mean values of bank regulations and other institutional country level variables, for each 
lender country in our sample, while Table 3 shows country mean values of variables 
describing macroeconomic and creditors’ rights conditions of borrower countries. 
 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
 Initial evidence of the correlation between variables is shown in Table 4. Remarkably, 
the variable for Capital requirements stringency shows a slightly negative correlation with the 
loan Spread, which suggests that, when forced to improve their level of capitalization, banks 
become sound and can afford to demand lower interest rates to borrowing firms. Concerning 
the other variables of bank regulations (Official supervisory power and Private Monitoring), 
they are positively correlated with Spread, and negatively correlated with loan Maturity. 
Hence, contrary to the Capital regulation measure, banks seem to transfer the pressure they 
suffer from Official supervision and Private Monitoring to their loans by increasing loan 
interest rates and shortening loan maturities. It is noticeable the positive correlations between 
bank regulations themselves, especially Capital with Official (26%) and Official with Private 
Monitoring (43%). In principle, these correlations seem to support the bank regulatory policy 
approach of reinforcing mechanisms designed to influence bank behaviour. Regarding other 
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country level controls, the level of Financial Development of the lender country has 
respectively small negative and positive correlations with Spread and Maturity, suggesting 
that the higher the level of Financial Development, the less risky are loan contracts. Turning 
to borrower country-specific controls, we notice that the Creditor Rights variable is weakly 
negatively correlated with Spread and positively correlated with Maturity. It might indicate 
that protecting creditors is beneficial in terms of reduction of risk taking in lending. Finally, 
given the extremely high negative correlation between borrower country Sovereign Credit 
Score and Log of GDP per capita (-88%), we decided to not include the last variable in the 
regressions to avoid problems of multicollinearity.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 
IV. Methodology and Results 
Our sample is structured in individual observations of loan deals originated across a 9-year 
period. One or more banks participate in each deal, and each bank participates in more than 
one deal, in each year8. Therefore, the loan deal is the level of analysis that allows the best use 
of the information available, regarding each individual loan characteristics9. Each loan deal is 
a unique event that produces the characteristics of a loan contract and for such it is treated as a 
separate individual. This invalidates any possibility of using fixed effects techniques across 
deals. 
We concluded that OLS regression is the method of analysis more suitable to our 
sample. We pooled all individual observations distributed across the 1998-2006 period to 
undertake single regressions. Year dummies were included in all regressions to take into 
account possible cyclical and time specific factors not captured by the explanatory variables. 
It is assumed that observations are independent across banks, but not necessarily independent 
within the same bank. Hence, robust standard errors clustered by banks are reported in all 
regressions. 
We recognize that many loan characteristics are jointly determined, which raises a 
concern for possible endogeneity of regressors if those characteristics are used as explanatory 
variables. We minimize this issue by simply restricting the loan-specific explanatory variables 
                                                 
8 Although the same loan may be extended by many banks (e.g., a syndicated loan), there is no loan 
replication in the sample, i.e., a loan deal is included only once. 
9 An alternative analysis could be panel regressions on bank-level data across the 1998-2006 period. That 
would require the aggregation of information about the deals in which a bank participates in each year. Such 
aggregation, however, would imply losing of information. 
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to the deal amount and dummies for most common deal purposes and deal types (see 
Appendix 1). We do not use loan Spread or Maturity as independent variables, i.e., each one 
appears only once in each regression, always as a dependent variable. Otherwise, more 
sophisticated techniques would be required, instead of plain OLS regressions. We also believe 
that the problem of omitted variables as a source of endogeneity is minimized with the use of 
a comprehensive set of regressors grouped in country-level, lender-specific, borrower-
specific, and loan-level explanatory variables representing supply and demand side factors 
affecting loan contract features. Problems of reverse causality are not a concern, as the 
majority of our explanatory variables are at the country-level, whereas the dependent 
variables are at the transaction level. 
The cross-country characteristic of our sample reveals another source of concern, 
which is the high dispersion in the number of observations per country. High economic 
developed lender countries have in general much more observations than low developed ones. 
For example, banks in the U.S. participate in 39 % of the loans. A problem exists if these 
banks drive the overall results by putting more weight on the country explanatory variables. 
To tackle this problem, we performed a robustness check by running all the regressions 
excluding U.S. lenders. The (unreported) results are not substantially changed, and validate 
the conclusions of this paper. 
To test hypotheses H1 to H3 proposed in Section II, we ran OLS regressions of loan 
Spread and Maturity on bank regulations variables, while controlling for the country, lender, 
borrower and loan specific factors described in Section II. The regressions are for the whole 
period (1998-2006), and encompass the three Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008) surveys sub-
periods of 1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006. Results are in Table 5.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Regression R1 of Table 5 shows that Capital requirements stringency is negatively 
related to loan Spread. However, the inclusion of a quadratic term in regression R2 of Table 5 
reveals an inverse U-shaped relationship between Capital requirements and Spread, with the 
maximum Spread occurring at a Capital level of 4.9, which is in the 10%-quantile of the 
sample. It means that countries with low or high levels of Capital stringency are the ones that 
experience lower Spread, whereas intermediate levels of Capital are associated with higher 
loan Spread.  
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The results concerning the effect of Capital on loan Maturity are very similar. 
Regression R4 in Table 5 shows a U-shaped relationship between Capital requirements and 
Maturity, with minimum Maturity at a Capital level of 4.2, which is also in the 10%-quantile 
of the sample. It means that loans in countries with low or high levels of Capital stringency 
experience longer maturities.  
Respectively for loan Spread and Maturity, the inverse and direct U-shaped 
relationships with Capital stringency found in Regressions R2 and R4 in Table 5, reveal a 
consistency between loan spread and maturity as risk measures. Theoretically, it may be 
supported by the so-called “signalling hypothesis” (Dennis et al., 2000), by which a longer 
maturity is a signal of good credit quality, which in turn translates to a lower loan rate.  
Summing up, these results show an inverse U-shaped relationship between loan risk 
characteristics and Capital requirements stringency: low priced risk terms of loan contracts, 
represented by low Spread and long Maturity, are associated with either low or high Capital 
requirements stringency, while loan contracts with higher risk characteristics prevail when the 
stringency of Capital regulations is moderate. Although consistent, these results do not 
unambiguously support hypothesis H1. For medium to high levels of Capital stringency, risk 
measures behave as proposed by the public interest view of regulation implicit in H1, i.e., risk 
measures decrease as Capital stringency grows. Nevertheless, the low risk reflected in loan 
contracts in countries with low Capital stringency and its increasing behaviour up to medium 
levels of Capital stringency threatens this view, although it is well grounded in some 
theoretical models, notably the ones that emphasize the role of banks as monitors for moral 
hazard risks. For instance, Besanko and Kanatas (1996) argue that the issuance of equity to 
meet capital requirements decrease loan monitoring incentives as a result of the dilution of 
insiders’ shareholders stake. One of the consequences is higher loan loss probabilities, which 
reflect in higher spreads. Another interpretation for the increasing relationship between risk 
measures and capital stringency for low to medium levels of the latter is that banks react to 
moderate capital regulations stringency by increasing spreads and shortening maturities, 
without changing their credit policies in the direction of strengthening loan screening and 
monitoring, which in turn would result in less risky loan contracts. Under this interpretation, 
only when capital regulations stringency is sufficiently large, banks strengthen their credit 
policies. A third possible explanation for the observation of riskier loan contracts at moderate 
stringency of capital regulations may be that incentives to risk-shifting are greater at higher 
probabilities of default deriving from moderate levels of capital stringency. By contrast, at 
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high stringency of capital regulations, probabilities of default are lower, resulting in lower 
incentives to risk-shifting and less risky loan contracts. 
Regarding the other regulatory measures, we do not find any relationships between 
loan Spread and Official supervisory power or Private Monitoring. However, Official 
supervisory power has a significant negative impact on loan Maturity. Together, the evidence 
found is against hypothesis H2, while hypothesis H3 is not supported. Concerning the role of 
bank supervision, it suggests that the private interest view prevails, in the sense that more 
empowered supervisors are associated to riskier bank lending, resulting in shorter maturities 
of loan contracts. Another interpretation may be that official supervision induces more 
conservative behaviour on the part of banks, which mitigate risk through the reduction of loan 
maturity. More conclusions on the effects of the three bank regulatory indices on loan 
contracts characteristics are given later in this section, when interactions between them are 
introduced. 
Concerning control variables, borrowers with poor senior debt Rating obtain funds 
through loans with higher spreads, according to regressions R1 and R2 in Table 5. These 
expected results for Spread contrast with the opposed ones obtained for loan Maturity. 
However, consistently with Diamond’s (1991) model, borrowers may use short loan maturity 
as a way to improve their ratings. Note that we found lower spreads for better rated firms, but 
also shorter maturities, as lenders may want to update such favourable credit conditions to 
borrowers in a frequent basis, particularly larger banks, that have less soft information 
(negative coefficient for Lender Assets in regression R3 of Table 5). The coefficient for Log of 
Deal Amount suggests that larger loan amounts are associated with loan contracts in better 
terms, which are captured by lower spreads and longer loan maturities. In addition, there is 
evidence that lower spreads are charged in loans extended to borrowers located in the same 
country as the lender, which suggests that problems of information asymmetry influence the 
risk terms of loan contracts. Concerning country-specific variables, the higher (worse) the 
Sovereign Credit Risk, the higher the loan contract risk measures (higher the Spread and 
shorter the Maturity), which is an expected result. Surprisingly, the variable for the economy 
size of borrower country, given by Log(GDP), has a positive effect on risk measures. On the 
other hand, variable GDP Growth reduces spreads and increases maturities, which supports an 
expected relationship between relaxed risk pricing and growth cycles. The lender country 
level of Financial Development does not enter significantly to explain neither loan Spread nor 
Maturity. However, further analyses are offered for this variable later. 
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Next, we seek to examine how interactions between bank regulations may affect loan 
spreads and maturity. We included interaction terms in the previous regressions and reported 
only the significant results in Table 6. From regression R3 in Table 6, we found again that 
Official supervisory power linearly decreases loan Maturity, but it interacts with Capital 
stringency to positively influence loan Maturity. Given the quadratic relationship between 
Capital and Maturity, we conclude that for low levels of Capital, where Maturity decreases 
with Capital, the opposite (positive) sign of the interaction term (Capital*Official) means that 
Capital decreases Maturity more for low levels of Official. In other words, it suggests that in 
countries where supervisory power is high, more stringent capital regulations are less prone to 
increase risk by decreasing maturity, which means these bank regulations work as substitutes. 
For higher levels of Capital, where Maturity increases with Capital, Official reinforces 
Capital to increase loan Maturity. Summing up, for low levels of capital stringency, official 
supervisory power counteracts with capital regulation to lower the decrease in loan maturity, 
while for high levels of capital stringency, the mechanisms reinforce each other to increase 
maturity.  
The evidence on interactions between capital stringency and private monitoring to 
influence risk comes both from spread and maturity measures. Regressions R1 and R2 in 
Table 6 convey the same message: for low levels of capital stringency, where Spread 
increases and Maturity decreases with Capital, Capital increases risk measures more for low 
levels of Private Monitoring; for high levels of capital stringency, Private Monitoring helps 
Capital to reduce loan risk characteristics (decreases spread and increases maturity). 
We conclude that the evidence regarding interactions between bank regulations is 
mixed. On the one hand, Capital and Official complement each other to reflect less risky loan 
contracts (through increasing loan Maturity) only when the level of Capital stringency is high. 
Similarly, Capital and Private Monitoring complement each other to reduce loan contract risk 
measures (through decreasing Spread and increasing Maturity) only when Capital stringency 
is high. On the other hand, Official and Private Monitoring behave as substitutes to Capital in 
reducing loan contracts risk measures when a country’s level of Capital stringency is low.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Results in Tables 7 to 9 provide evidence on interactions between regulations and 
other country-level factors. We split the sample in sub-samples of low and high Rule of Law, 
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lender country Financial Development, and Competition (measured by lender country’s 
logarithm of number of banks), according to their medians across lender countries. 
Concerning the influence of Capital stringency variable on loan contracts risk characteristics, 
the results show a sharp contrast between sub-samples of low and high values of those lender 
country variables. Regressions in second, fourth and sixth columns of both Tables 7 and 8 
point that capital stringency decreases priced risk loan characteristics (i.e., decreases Spread 
and increases Maturity) especially in lender countries with high levels of legal enforcement 
(measured by Rule of Law), financial development and competition. These findings are very 
reasonable, as they highlight the importance of a country’s levels of financial development, 
enforcement of law, and banking industry competition, as mechanisms that enable  the 
effectiveness of capital regulations in reducing loan risk terms.  
From the regressions in third column of Table 7, and first and third columns of Table 
8, we conclude that private monitoring increases risk characteristics of loan contracts in 
countries with poor developed legal and financial systems. Such evidence on private 
monitoring supports the public interest view of regulation, according to which it is not 
recommended to rely on the external monitoring of markets to contain bank risk taking when 
financial development is not high enough. 
 
 Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here 
 
We extend our analysis of the influence of institutional factors at the lender country-
level by including interaction terms between them and bank regulations variables in the 
regressions. There were no significant results for loan Spread, while loan Maturity appears 
affected by these interactions. It suggests that maybe loan Spread has lower sensibility to this 
kind of interactions, when compared to loan Maturity. Alternatively, it is the case that loan 
Spread is well explained by the basic determinants of Tables 5 and 6, with no room for 
interactions between bank regulations and other lender country factors. Table 9 reports the 
significant results for loan Maturity. In principle, Rule of Law is not significant to help 
explaining loan Maturity (results unreported). However, regression R1 in Table 9 shows that 
Rule of Law interacts with Capital regulations stringency to influence loan Maturity. 
Similarly to results in Table 5, we found a direct U-shaped relationship between Capital and 
Maturity. The interaction term between Capital and Rule of Law is positive. Accordingly, at 
low levels of Capital stringency, for which Maturity decreases with Capital, the interaction 
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produces an opposite effect, which means that Rule of Law interacts with Capital to alleviate 
the decrease in Maturity. For high levels of Capital stringency, at which Maturity increases 
with Capital, the interaction is in the same direction, which means that increasing both Rule 
of Law and Capital has a stronger impact in increasing loan Maturity. Therefore, Rule of Law 
has the unambiguous marginal effect of risk reduction, through its combination with Capital 
stringency to increase the Maturity of loan contracts. Figure 1 illustrates, for three different 
levels of Rule of Law, the joint effect of Capital and Rule of Law on loan Maturity10 according 
to regression R2. It is clear from Figure 1 that stricter capital regulations are more effective in 
increasing the maturity of loan contracts when the country’s legal system is more enforceable. 
Moreover, more stringent capital regulations in countries with poor rule of law experience a 
stronger decreasing impact on loan maturities, when compared to countries with higher rule of 
law. Together, the evidence from Tables 7, 8 and 9 shows that capital regulations are more 
effective in reducing the risk of lending when legal systems are more developed.  
Competition interacts with Capital stringency to positively influence loan Maturity, 
according to regression R2 in Table 9. At low levels of Capital, where Maturity decreases 
with Capital, the interaction term has the opposite effect on Maturity. Similarly to Rule of 
Law, Competition has an unambiguous marginal effect of decreasing risk of loan contracts, 
through its joint impact, with Capital stringency, of increasing loan Maturity. . Figure 2 
illustrates, for three different levels of Competition, the joint effect of Capital and 
Competition on loan Maturity found in regression R4 of Table 9. Together with the previous 
evidence of Tables 7 and 8, this finding supports the idea that more stringent capital 
regulations are more effective in reducing risk characteristics of loan contracts when bank 
industries are more competitive. Despite the negative coefficient of Competition alone, it is 
clear from Figure 2 that the positive interaction between it and Capital offsets that negative 
influence on Maturity when Competition is above median and Capital stringency level is 
greater than 4.  
Our last piece of evidence concerns the interaction of Private Monitoring with Rule of 
Law and Competition. Regressions R3 and R4 in Table 9 show positive coefficients for the 
interaction terms between these variables. Given that Private Monitoring has a negative 
coefficient, the effect of interactions is to counterbalance the decreasing impact of Private 
Monitoring on loan Maturity. Precisely, Private Monitoring linearly reduces loan Maturity, 
                                                 
10 The lines plotted in Figure 1 correspond to the joint effect of Capital and Rule of Law on Maturity. The 
dependent variable in regression R2 in Table 9 is the logarithm of loan maturity. Hence, the function plotted is a 
factor that, after multiplied by other factor including the remaining explanatory variables, equals loan maturity. 
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but this effect is more important when the levels of either Rule of Law or Competition are low. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the models of, respectively, regressions R3 and R4. Due to negative 
coefficients of both Private Monitoring and Rule of Law, the combination of low Rule of Law 
and Private Monitoring up to a level of 10 produces the longest maturities. However, Figure 3 
shows that the interaction term is able to make increasing the relationship between Private 
Monitoring and loan Maturity when Rule of Law is above its mean.  On the other hand, due to 
a lower negative impact of Competition alone on Maturity (R4), when compared to the impact 
of Rule of Law alone (R3), only the combination of low Private Monitoring and low 
Competition produces the longest maturities. Figure 4 shows that, for levels of Competition 
above its median, the positive effect of the interaction on loan Maturity more than offsets the 
negative individual impacts of both Private Monitoring and Competition on Maturity, 
resulting in an increasing relationship between Private Monitoring and loan Maturity. The 
evidence adds to that obtained in Table 6, and reinforces that, although external private 
monitoring on banks solely increases the risk characteristics of loan contracts, its interaction 
with either Capital stringency, Rule of Law, or Competition, highlights its importance as a 
complementary mechanism in the reduction of lending risk. 
Regression R5 in Table 9 shows that all previous interaction effects treated in 
regressions R1 to R4 are still present when they are simultaneously included in the same 
model. Finally, we conclude for the evidence of a complementary role of both bank 
competition and legal enforcement to bank regulations in achieving the reduction of priced 
risk characteristics of loan contracts. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
Insert Figures 1 to 4 about here 
 
 
 
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we empirically examined the effect that three broad bank regulations 
implemented by countries exert on banks’ credit policies: the level of stringency of capital 
restrictions imposed to banks, the degree of the power that the official supervisor authority 
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has to oversee and intervene in the functioning of banks, and the degree to which banks are 
exposed to external private monitoring, apart from official regulatory oversight. 
The results indicate that priced risk terms of loan contracts have an inverse U-shaped 
relationship with capital regulations stringency. Precisely, we found evidence of loan 
contracts with lower spreads and longer maturities when the stringency of capital regulations 
is either low or high, while higher spreads and shorter maturities are associated to moderate 
levels of capital stringency. The decreasing behaviour of loan contracts’ risk measures from 
moderate to high levels of capital stringency favours the view that strengthening capital 
regulations contains bank risk taking. However, the increasing behaviour of risk measures 
from low to medium levels of capital stringency opposes that view and supports the argument 
of a reduction in loan monitoring incentives by banks as a consequence of toughening capital 
requirements. However, it may be the case that higher risk measures in this region is simply 
the result of shifting the pressure of slightly stricter capital regulations to loan price terms, 
rather than the banks’ reaction to capital toughening in the form of relaxing credit policies, 
which would be the case only if capital regulations become significantly stringent. Regarding 
the role of official supervision, we found that more empowered supervisors contribute to 
riskier bank lending, through the shortening of loan contracts’ maturities. Interestingly, there 
is evidence of interactions between bank regulations influencing loan contracts risk terms: 
both official supervisory power and private monitoring behave either as substitutes or 
complements to capital stringency to reduce loan contracts risk measures, depending whether 
capital stringency is respectively low or high. Together, this evidence reveals that, at high 
levels of capital regulations stringency, loan contracts tend to experience less riskas a 
consequence of both the superior financial soundness of better-capitalized banks and the 
complementary roles of supervision and market discipline in containing bank risk-taking.  
This study provides a valuable piece of evidence on the interactions between bank 
regulations and other institutional country level factors when influencing bank lending. We 
found that a country’s levels of financial development, enforcement of law, and competition 
in the banking industry, are mechanisms that enable the effectiveness of capital regulations in 
reducing loan contracts risk terms. Finally, we found that although external private 
monitoring on banks alone increases the risk characteristics of loan contracts, its interaction 
with both capital regulations stringency and banking competition highlights its importance as 
a complementary mechanism in the reduction of the risk of lending. 
The results suggest more complex interactions between bank regulations to influence 
risk taking behaviour than simply playing complementary roles, as advocated by proponents 
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of reinforcing pillars of Basel II. Loan contracts in countries where capital regulations are 
more relaxed experience longer maturities, and this is especially true if official supervisory 
power is also low. Increasing capital stringency up to a moderate level shortens maturity but 
this effect is counterbalanced if official supervisory power is high, which suggests that official 
supervision substitutes capital in keeping loan maturities long. 
This paper opens avenues for future research. The analysis presented is cross-
sectional, given that we have only three waves of data concerning the regulatory indices used. 
If more data become available in the form of another survey of bank regulation and 
supervision, these can be incorporated to enhance our estimation techniques. A new survey 
would open the possibility for conducting a longitudinal analysis of how variation in 
regulatory measures produce changes in the credit policy followed by each individual bank, 
e.g., through fixed effects estimation. Such longitudinal approach will help tackling 
endogeneity issues of reverse causality related to the changes in regulation triggered by 
certain condition in the credit market and issues related to cost adjustments. Finally, issues of 
simultaneous versus sequential implementation of both capital requirements and supervision 
regulations will be properly addressed in a longitudinal study.   
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Appendix 1 – Description of Explanatory Variables  
 
Variable Description Source 
Lender country specific   
Capital Stringency It is the Capital Requirements Stringency Index of Barth et al. (2006). It measures the level of 
stringency of capital restrictions imposed to banks, such as eligible funds for entering in the 
banking industry, and the use of risk based approaches by central banks when defining capital 
ratio requirements. Constructed for three periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using 
data from the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, 
it ranges from 2 to its maximum possible value of 10, with higher values representing stricter 
capital regulations.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Official Supervisory Power It is the Official Supervisory Power Index of Barth et al. (2006). It represents the degree of the 
power that the supervisor authority has to oversee and intervene in banks functioning. Also 
constructed for three periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from the surveys on 
bank regulation and supervision conducted by the World Bank. In our data, the index ranges from 4 
to 15.5.  
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Private Monitoring It is the Private Monitoring Index of Barth et al. (2006). It gives a measure of the degree to which 
banks are exposed to external monitoring, apart from official regulatory and supervisory oversight. It 
comprises regulatory requirements of information and accounting disclosure, external auditing, 
depositor protection, use of subordinated debt, and discipline. The index was constructed for three 
periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003 and 2004-2006), using data from the surveys on bank regulation and 
supervision conducted by the World Bank. Higher values of the index represent more regulations 
promoting the private monitoring of banks. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008).  
Financial Development A proxy of a lender’s country financial development, constructed by Beck et al. (2000), using raw data 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, October 2008. This variable is given by the total 
credit to the private sector by deposit money banks, as a share of GDP. It is available for each year of 
the period. Higher values of this variable should correspond to more developed financial systems. 
 
Beck et al. (2000). 
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Variable Description Source 
Log (Number of Banks) It is the natural logarithm of the number of commercial banks in the country, made available by Barth 
et al. (2001, 2006, 2008), based on the surveys on bank regulation and supervision conducted by the 
World Bank. 
 
Barth et al. (2001, 
2006, 2008). 
Rule of Law It is a country governance indicator constructed by Kaufmann et al. (2008) measuring perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. The authors rely on multiple sources to construct a weighted aggregate indicator. 
 
Kaufmann et al. 
(2008). 
 
Borrower country specific 
  
Creditor Rights It is the index of La Porta et al. (1998), which measures a country’s level of legal protection of lenders, 
against expropriation by borrowers. It is assumed constant along the period from 1997 to 2006. If it is 
not available for a country, zero is assigned to this variable, and a separate indicator for creditor rights 
index missing is included. 
 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Log (GDP) The natural logarithm of the annual country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), where GDP is given in 
billions of US Dollars. This variable is supposed to measure the size of a country’s economy. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
Log (GDP per capita) The natural logarithm of the annual country’s GDP per capita. This variable is relied as a measure of a 
country’s economic development. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
GDP growth The percent growth in a country’s GDP from the previous year to the current year. This variable 
reflects a country’s business cycle. 
 
IMF (International 
Financial Statistics) 
Sovereign Credit Risk It is an index ranging from 1 to 24, representing the borrower’s country Fitch Sovereign Rating on 
foreign currency, long term debt. Higher values of the index represent higher risk. It is available for 
each year. 
 
 
 
 
  
Fitch Ratings. 
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Variable Description Source 
   
Lender specific   
Log (Assets) The natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank. It is a measure of the size of the bank. Available 
for each year. 
 
Bankscope. 
Leverage It is the ratio of total book value of liabilities to total book value of assets. It is available for each year. 
 
Bankscope. 
   
Borrower specific   
Debt Rating This variable consists of an index ranging from 1 to 6, representing the Moody’s senior debt rating at 
the close of the loan. When Moody’s ratings are missing, S&P ratings are used. The index equal to 1 
represents a rating of “Aaa”, 2 indicates “Aa”, and 6 indicates “B” or worse. If there is no rating 
information for the borrower, zero is assigned to this variable. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Same country A dummy variable that indicates if the loan was made to a borrower in the same country as the lender. 
 
LPC DealScan 
Industry sector Ten indicators, corresponding to the first digit of the SIC code that describes the broad sector of 
activity of the borrower.  
 
LPC DealScan. 
   
Loan specific   
Log (Loan Amount) It is the natural logarithm of the loan deal amount, expressed in US Dollars. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Loan Purpose dummies These are 7 indicators of the most common specific purposes of the loan, which accounts for 82% of 
the loans in the sample. These purposes are: Acquisition line, CP backup, Corporate Purposes, Debt 
Repayment, LBO/MBO, Takeover, and Working Capital. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
Loan Type dummies Five variables, accounting for 77% of the loans in the sample, indicating the most common types of 
deals: 364-day facility, Term Loan, and Revolver line >= 1 year. 
 
LPC DealScan. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Percentile 
10% 
Percentile 
25% 
Median Percentile 
75% 
Percentile 
90% 
Spread (basis points) 32,354 188.80 172.98 -295 15,000 40 75 155 250 350 
Log of Maturity (months) 41,965 3.66 0.82 0 10.09 2.48 3.18 4.01 4.09 4.43 
Capital 46,453 6.38 1.25 2 10 5 6 6 7 7 
Official 46,453 11.14 2.36 4 14 7 9 12 13 13 
Private Monitoring 46,453 8.79 1.36 5 11 7 8 9 10 10 
Log of Deal Amount 46,453 18.76 1.47 0 24.61 16.86 17.81 18.81 19.74 20.61 
Lender Size (Log of Assets) 46,453 20.03 1.06 13.09 21.40 18.75 19.62 20.27 20.81 21.10 
Lender Leverage 46,453 0.94 0.03 0.51 1.25 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.97 
Borrower Rating Score* 46,453 1.22 2.13 0 6 0 0 0 3 5 
Creditor Rights 46,453 1.49 1.00 0 4 1 1 1 2 3 
Financial Development  46,453 0.84 0.42 0 2.01 0.48 0.52 0.85 1.10 1.45 
Log of GDP 46,453 8.06 1.56 1.05 9.49 5.70 7.03 9.08 9.26 9.43 
Log of GDP per capita 46,453 10.19 0.75 5.95 11.41 9.51 10.22 10.46 10.54 10.64 
GDP growth 46,453 3.06 1.81 -13.13 30.55 0.88 1.99 3.04 3.85 4.53 
Sovereign Rating Score 46,453 2.43 2.87 1 24 1 1 1 3 6 
Same Country 46,453 0.63 0.48 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
* Zero if unrated.
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Table 2 – Lender Country Descriptive Statistics (Mean of country-specific variables in 
the 1998-2006 period) 
 
  Country Capital Official 
Private  
Monitoring 
Financial 
Development 
Rule of 
Law 
Number 
of Banks 
1 ARGENTINA 7.5 9.8 8.3 0.17 -0.37 88 
2 AUSTRALIA 6.4 11.5 9.8 0.88 1.77 52 
3 AUSTRIA 7.8 12.1 6.0 1.03 1.83 921 
4 BELGIUM 6.6 11.1 7.0 0.75 1.41 112 
5 BRAZIL 6.6 13.7 8.7 0.30 -0.34 181 
6 CANADA 4.0 7.5 9.0 1.02 1.77 63 
7 CHILE 5.6 10.6 7.3 0.59 1.16 28 
8 DENMARK 7.1 8.9 9.3 1.10 1.87 181 
9 EGYPT 5.0 13.2 9.0 0.48 -0.06 41 
10 FINLAND 4.7 7.7 9.1 0.59 1.89 10 
11 FRANCE 6.0 7.3 6.2 0.86 1.35 366 
12 GERMANY 6.3 8.8 7.5 1.13 1.70 1999 
13 GREECE 4.9 10.6 7.2 0.57 0.74 27 
14 HONG KONG 6.0 11.0 8.5 1.53 1.18 164 
15 INDIA 7.6 9.2 6.9 0.29 0.12 96 
16 INDONESIA 5.9 12.3 8.4 0.28 -0.85 148 
17 IRELAND 4.9 10.5 9.2 1.09 1.61 53 
18 ISRAEL 5.5 8.3 9.6 0.80 0.88 22 
19 ITALY 5.4 6.6 7.2 0.74 0.72 845 
20 JAPAN 6.4 12.0 9.4 1.44 1.39 248 
21 JORDAN 7.7 10.1 7.4 0.72 0.37 20 
22 KOREA (South) 4.5 10.5 10.0 0.79 0.72 20 
23 MALAYSIA 3.9 11.6 9.3 1.28 0.46 29 
24 MEXICO 7.4 9.5 7.9 0.17 -0.45 38 
25 NETHERLANDS 5.3 7.1 8.2 1.55 1.75 586 
26 NORWAY 7.5 8.7 7.5 0.70 1.93 15 
27 PAKISTAN 8.5 13.3 8.5 0.24 -0.82 38 
28 PHILIPPINES 5.6 11.3 8.5 0.35 -0.46 45 
29 PORTUGAL 6.8 13.6 7.5 1.22 1.16 59 
30 SINGAPORE 7.2 9.6 8.9 1.03 1.62 125 
31 SOUTH AFRICA 8.3 6.4 9.2 0.65 0.15 51 
32 SPAIN 9.6 9.6 8.3 1.03 1.25 286 
33 SWEDEN 2.9 6.3 6.9 0.74 1.83 25 
34 SWITZERLAND 6.2 13.6 8.1 1.61 1.98 370 
35 TAIWAN 5.8 11.3 8.3 . 0.84 40 
36 THAILAND 5.6 9.7 8.3 1.14 0.24 26 
37 UNITED KINGDOM 6.7 10.1 9.6 1.34 1.73 394 
38 USA 6.7 13.0 9.2 0.51 1.60 8697 
39 VENEZUELA 3.9 12.1 5.6 0.10 -0.90 24 
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Table 3 – Borrower Country Descriptive Statistics (Number of loans and mean of variables across the 1998-2006 period) 
  Country Loans 
Creditor 
Rights GDP 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Sovereign 
Score 
   
Country Loans 
Creditor 
Rights GDP 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Sovereign 
Score 
1 Argentina 178 1 220 5,939 2.80 18.89  43 Kuwait 15 - 48 18,479 5.80 4.78 
2 Australia 1,218 1 500 25,346 3.55 2.56  44 Latvia 4 - 11 4,551 7.75 8.22 
3 Austria 42 3 241 29,761 2.26 1.00  45 Lithuania 11 - 17 4,799 6.54 9.22 
4 Azerbaijan 5 - 8 970 12.28 12.25  46 Luxembourg 51 - 27 59,068 5.40 1.00 
5 Bahrain 19 - 9 13,444 6.51 8.00  47 Malaysia 412 4 107 4,401 4.42 8.67 
6 Belgium 128 2 292 28,156 2.33 3.11  48 Mali 3 - 4 330 5.09 16.00 
7 Bolivia 4 - 9 994 3.26 16.00  49 Malta 3 - 5 11,753 1.29 6.00 
8 Brazil 356 1 718 4,096 2.57 13.67  50 Mexico 381 0 608 6,089 3.62 10.56 
9 Bulgaria 19 - 18 2,311 3.89 11.71  51 Netherlands 558 2 488 30,389 2.59 1.00 
10 Cameroon 2 - 13 766 4.05 15.00  52 New Zealand 129 3 73 18,396 3.04 2.20 
11 Canada 1,490 1 837 26,670 3.46 2.00  53 Nigeria 3 4 67 518 7.32 13.00 
12 Chile 213 2 88 5,653 3.94 6.78  54 Norway 197 2 213 46,757 2.70 1.00 
13 China 293 - 1,549 1,205 9.21 6.89  55 Panama 32 - 13 4,226 5.08 11.00 
14 Colombia 51 0 97 2,241 2.64 11.22  56 Papua New Guinea 8 - 4 747 0.82 14.57 
15 Costa Rica 8 - 17 4,256 5.34 12.00  57 Peru 39 0 64 2,447 3.88 12.38 
16 Croatia 38 - 27 6,054 4.00 10.22  58 Philippines 190 0 83 1,051 4.18 11.50 
17 Cyprus 5 - 12 16,970 3.75 4.50  59 Poland 100 - 217 5,669 4.26 8.11 
18 Czech Republic 67 - 84 8,233 2.87 7.56  60 Portugal 53 1 143 13,761 2.25 3.00 
19 Denmark 64 3 201 37,423 2.17 1.67  61 Romania 57 - 59 2,706 2.66 13.11 
20 Dominican Rep. 1 - 21 2,548 6.00 14.00  62 Russia 288 - 456 3,147 5.06 12.67 
21 Ecuador 4 4 27 2,082 3.37 16.67  63 Saudi Arabia 19 - 216 10,023 3.35 5.50 
22 Egypt 46 4 89 1,350 5.03 10.56  64 Serbia 1 - 20 2,475 2.30 13.00 
23 El Salvador 9 - 14 2,209 2.91 11.00  65 Singapore 398 4 99 24,010 5.39 1.56 
24 Estonia 7 - 9 6,445 7.81 7.50  66 Slovakia 30 - 31 5,731 4.37 9.75 
25 Finland 140 1 153 29,366 3.77 1.11  67 Slovenia 13 - 29 14,317 4.21 5.44 
26 France 1,225 0 1,675 27,987 2.31 1.00  68 South Africa 66 3 166 3,655 3.45 9.78 
27 Germany 770 3 2,323 28,212 1.44 1.00  69 Spain 757 2 797 19,083 3.83 1.78 
28 Ghana 8 - 8 406 4.89 14.50  70 Sri Lanka 1 3 18 973 4.87 13.00 
29 Greece 195 1 175 15,898 4.09 6.56  71 Sweden 250 2 291 32,532 3.22 2.22 
30 Hong Kong 580 4 170 25,265 3.74 4.33  72 Switzerland 209 1 304 42,144 1.92 1.00 
31 Hungary 51 - 72 7,074 4.42 7.67  73 Taiwan 1,039 2 315 14,037 4.38 5.00 
32 Iceland 19 - 11 36,989 4.60 4.00  74 Thailand 366 3 144 2,270 2.79 9.44 
33 India 239 4 559 538 6.53 11.14  75 Tunisia 15 - 23 2,393 4.88 9.33 
34 Indonesia 109 4 216 1,019 2.69 14.89  76 Turkey 79 2 316 4,907 4.44 14.00 
35 Iran 39 - 134 2,042 4.71 13.75  77 Turkmenistan 1 - 9 1,934 12.24 15.00 
36 Ireland 94 1 135 34,184 7.24 1.11  78 USA 23,432 1 10,501 36,553 3.12 1.00 
37 Israel 24 4 118 18,274 3.58 7.00  79 Ukraine 30 - 54 1,134 4.65 14.17 
38 Italy 406 2 1,393 24,257 1.50 3.44  80 United Kingdom 2,167 4 1,737 29,236 2.85 1.00 
39 Jamaica 2 - 8 3,133 0.92 14.00  81 Uruguay 10 2 18 5,350 1.84 10.00 
40 Japan 6,069 2 4,299 33,819 1.12 2.44  82 Venezuela 53 - 113 4,536 3.01 14.00 
41 Kazakhstan 31 - 34 2,249 7.48 11.44  83 Vietnam 16 - 38 476 7.12 13.00 
42 Korea (South) 699 3 583 12,286 4.37 7.22   Total 46,453      
 39 
 
 
Table 4 – Correlation Matrix 
(Sample: 46,453 loans made by 278 banks of 39 countries, in the 1998-2006 period) 
 
 Spread  Matur. Capital Official Private 
Monit. 
Deal 
amount 
Lender 
Size 
Lender 
Lever. 
Borr. 
Score 
Credit. 
Rights 
Fin. 
Devel. 
Log of 
GDP pc 
GDP 
Growth 
Spread 1             
Log of Maturity  0.15 1            
Capital -0.04 0.10 1           
Official 0.03 -0.11 0.26 1          
Private Monitoring 0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.43 1         
Log of Deal Amount -0.17 0.06 0.08 -0.13 -0.03 1        
Lender Size  0.00 -0.05 0.19 -0.01 0.09 0.20 1       
Lender Leverage -0.08 0.03 -0.14 -0.56 -0.39 0.11 0.24 1      
Borrower Rating Score 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.38 0.17 -0.04 1     
(borrower) Cred. Rights -0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.16 -0.21 1    
(lender) Fin. Develop.  -0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.33 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.50 -0.04 0.27 1   
(borrower) Log GDP pc 0.02 -0.09 0.08 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.32 -0.10 0.17 -0.13 -0.05 1  
(borrower) GDP growth -0.04 0.13 0.14 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 0.00* -0.09 -0.33 1 
(borrower) Sov. Score 0.01 0.06 -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.13 -0.23 0.12 -0.20 0.11 0.07 -0.88 0.20 
* Not Significant (at the 5% level). 
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Table 5 – Relationship between Bank Regulations and Loan Contracts Characteristics 
Dependent variables in columns. OLS regressions+ over the period 1998-2006. Robust standard errors 
clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-specific controls 
(industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted.  
 
Explanatory  Spread  Log of Maturity a 
Variables R1 R2 R3 R4 
  
Lender Country’s Bank Regulations 
 
1 Capital  -6.63 *** 
(2.05) 
19.26 * 
(10.85) 
4.10 *** 
(1.00) 
-7.97 ** 
(3.39) 
2 Capital ^2 
 
-2.05 ** 
(0.83)  
0.95 *** 
(0.28) 
3 Official -0.02  
(2.58) 
-0.74  
(2.69) 
-2.12 *** 
(0.58) 
-1.72 *** 
(0.55) 
4 Private 
Monitoring 
1.62  
(3.26) 
0.20  
(3.08) 
-0.31  
(0.98) 
0.28  
(0.92) 
      
 Lender, borrower and loan specific  
5 Lender Log 
(Assets) 
0.32  
(3.13) 
-0.98  
(3.04) 
-2.60 ** 
(1.01) 
-1.99 * 
(1.06) 
6 Lender 
Leverage 
-2.24  
(2.61) 
-1.94  
(2.61) 
-0.85  
(0.80) 
-0.91  
(0.79) 
7 Borrower 
Rating 
6.81 *** 
(0.79) 
6.78 *** 
(0.77) 
2.46 *** 
(0.50) 
2.46 *** 
(0.49) 
8 Log (Deal 
Amount) 
-20.83 *** 
(1.27) 
-20.90 *** 
(1.27) 
6.47 *** 
(1.08) 
6.41 *** 
(1.08) 
9 Same Country -12.10 ** 
(5.15) 
-12.15 ** 
(5.11) 
-1.71  
(3.50) 
-1.37  
(3.46) 
     
 Borrower Country Specific (except b)  
10 Creditor Rights -1.91  
(1.76) 
-2.35  
(1.72) 
-0.16  
(1.01) 
0.10  
(0.96) 
11 Creditor Rights 
missing 
-2.54  
(10.03) 
-5.37  
(9.90) 
-0.23  
(4.88) 
1.13  
(4.82) 
12 Log (GDP) 19.35 *** 
(1.94) 
18.98 *** 
(1.88) 
-4.48 *** 
(0.82) 
-4.29 *** 
(0.81) 
13 GDP growth -4.33 *** 
(1.05) 
-4.20 *** 
(1.05) 
1.67 *** 
(0.49) 
1.58 *** 
(0.49) 
14 Sovereign 
Credit Risk 
7.15 *** 
(1.05) 
7.09 *** 
(1.04) 
-2.82 *** 
(0.66) 
-2.79 *** 
(0.66) 
15 Lender Country 
Fin. Develop. b 
-12.81  
(10.98) 
-14.75  
(11.14) 
3.03  
(3.45) 
4.05  
(3.59) 
     
Observations 32,354 32,354 41,965 41,965 
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.35 0.35 
+ Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
a Coefficients and standard errors of Log (Maturity) regressions are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 6 –Effect of Interactions between Bank Regulations on Loan Spread and Maturity 
Dependent variables: Spread and Log(Maturity). OLS regressions+ over the period 1998-2006. Robust 
standard errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-specific 
controls (industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted.  
 
 Spread Log of Maturity a 
Explanatory Variables R1 R2 R3 
  
Lender Country’s Bank Regulations 
 
1 Capital  47.07 *** 
(11.48) 
-16.39 *** 
(4.50) 
-12.91 *** 
(4.37) 
2 Capital^2 -1.71 ** 
(0.84) 
0.87 *** 
(0.31) 
0.78 *** 
(0.28) 
3 Official -1.20  
(2.26) 
-1.57 *** 
(0.56) 
-6.78 *** 
(2.18) 
4 Private Monitoring 22.97 *** 
(6.15) 
-6.32 ** 
(2.51) 
0.72  
(0.93) 
5 Capital x Official 
  
0.79 *** 
(0.30) 
6 Capital x  Private 
Monitoring 
-4.03 *** 
(1.29) 
1.17 ** 
(0.48) 
 
  
Lender, borrower and loan specific 
 
  
7 Lender Log (Assets) 1.08  
(3.15) 
-2.52 ** 
(1.11) 
-2.17 ** 
(1.06) 
8 Lender Leverage -3.22  
(2.72) 
-0.55  
(0.74) 
-0.60  
(0.74) 
9 Borrower Rating 6.72 *** 
(0.78) 
2.48 *** 
(0.49) 
2.41 *** 
(0.48) 
10 Log (Deal Amount) -20.75 *** 
(1.25) 
6.34 *** 
(1.09) 
6.37 *** 
(1.08) 
11 Same Country -10.75 ** 
(5.11) 
-1.52  
(3.48) 
-1.39  
(3.46) 
    
  Borrower Country Specific (except a)  
12 Creditor Rights -2.49  
(1.74) 
0.13  
(0.95) 
0.29  
(0.93) 
13 Creditor Rights missing -5.98  
(9.83) 
1.28  
(4.83) 
1.27  
(4.77) 
14 Log (GDP) 18.73 *** 
(1.84) 
-4.25 *** 
(0.81) 
-4.28 *** 
(0.79) 
15 GDP growth -4.43 *** 
(1.05) 
1.61 *** 
(0.49) 
1.53 *** 
(0.49) 
16 Sovereign Credit Risk 7.06 *** 
(1.02) 
-2.76 *** 
(0.66) 
-2.74 *** 
(0.65) 
17 Lender Country Fin. 
Develop. a 
-13.42  
(10.21) 
3.91  
(3.70) 
3.25  
(3.41) 
    
Observations 32,354 41,965 41,965 
R-squared 0.21 0.35 0.35 
    + Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
     a Coefficients and standard errors of Log (Maturity) regressions are multiplied by 100. 
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Table 7 –Bank Regulations and Loan Spread: sub-samples of high and low lender country Rule 
of Law, Financial Development and Competition.  
Dependent variable: Spread. OLS regressions+ over the period 1998-2006. Robust standard errors 
clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-specific controls 
(industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted.  
 
Explanatory  Rule of Law Financial Development  Competition  
Variables Low High Low High Low High 
  
Lender Country’s Bank Regulations 
    
1 Capital  -0.66  
(5.92) 
-6.02 ** 
(2.32) 
-0.38  
(3.69) 
-6.63 *** 
(1.81) 
-6.30 ** 
(3.00) 
-6.03 ** 
(2.48) 
2 Official 11.76 ** 
(4.55) 
0.34  
(2.87) 
-6.63 ** 
(2.94) 
-1.43  
(2.41) 
0.13  
(2.64) 
1.49  
(3.27) 
3 Private 
Monitoring 
-3.89  
(7.01) 
1.48  
(3.30) 
7.77 * 
(4.04) 
-1.71  
(2.94) 
-12.75 ** 
(5.91) 
2.18  
(4.17) 
  
Lender, borrower and loan specific 
    
     
4 Lender Log 
(Assets) 
-17.51 ** 
(8.50) 
-1.16  
(3.86) 
-2.21  
(6.05) 
-9.66 ** 
(4.78) 
-11.02 ** 
(5.20) 
-3.03  
(4.14) 
5 Lender 
Leverage 
4.33 ** 
(1.89) 
-2.46  
(3.09) 
-4.79  
(4.52) 
4.56 ** 
(1.94) 
4.41 *** 
(1.63) 
-1.83  
(2.91) 
6 Borrower 
Rating 
3.96  
(10.44) 
6.68 *** 
(0.78) 
6.37 *** 
(1.10) 
8.06 *** 
(1.40) 
9.39 *** 
(1.81) 
6.53 *** 
(0.82) 
7 Log (Deal 
Amount) 
-5.51  
(4.77) 
-21.49 *** 
(1.26) 
-23.35 *** 
(1.44) 
-16.77 *** 
(2.05) 
-13.74 *** 
(3.48) 
-20.97 *** 
(1.29) 
8 Same Country -3.09  
(15.58) 
-12.95 ** 
(5.50) 
-33.21 *** 
(10.92) 
-16.92 *** 
(6.20) 
9.69  
(10.35) 
-15.50 ** 
(6.22) 
       
 Borrower Country Specific (except a)     
9 Creditor Rights -12.36 * 
(7.03) 
-2.65  
(2.03) 
-5.76  
(4.21) 
0.46  
(1.88) 
-3.79  
(5.38) 
-3.28  
(2.05) 
10 Creditor Rights 
missing 
-89.88 *** 
(32.31) 
0.15  
(9.96) 
-10.10  
(11.22) 
-11.53  
(12.53) 
-75.33 *** 
(24.87) 
-1.33  
(10.09) 
11 Log (GDP) 10.92 * 
(5.68) 
18.51 *** 
(1.88) 
23.09 *** 
(2.90) 
13.83 *** 
(1.81) 
25.07 *** 
(3.53) 
17.67 *** 
(2.02) 
12 GDP growth 2.50  
(2.28) 
-4.77 *** 
(1.07) 
-6.23 *** 
(1.67) 
-1.56  
(1.29) 
2.48  
(1.70) 
-4.69 *** 
(1.09) 
13 Sovereign 
Credit Risk 
11.27 *** 
(2.79) 
6.57 *** 
(1.14) 
5.48 *** 
(1.13) 
6.81 *** 
(1.40) 
14.57 *** 
(2.31) 
6.17 *** 
(1.10) 
14 Lender Country 
Fin. Develop. a 
105.19 ** 
(47.36) 
-12.41  
(11.39) 
-14.06  
(66.91) 
16.87  
(13.37) 
51.59  
(35.21) 
-12.95  
(12.52) 
       
Observations 1,674 30,514 16,531 14,028 2,638 29,666 
R-squared 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.21 
+ Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
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Table 8 –Lender Country Bank Regulations and Loan Maturity: sub-samples of high and low 
lender country Rule of Law, Financial Development and Competition.  
Dependent variable: Log of Maturity. OLS regressions+ over the period 1998-2006. Robust standard 
errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-specific controls 
(industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted. All coefficients and standard errors are 
multiplied by 100. 
 
Explanatory  Rule of Law Financial Development  Competition  
Variables Low High Low High Low High 
  
Lender Country’s Bank Regulations 
    
1 Capital  -0.86  
(1.73) 
4.55 *** 
(1.30) 
-0.39  
(1.57) 
3.95 *** 
(0.59) 
-0.06  
(1.00) 
4.84 *** 
(1.50) 
2 Official -1.55  
(1.37) 
-2.49 *** 
(0.64) 
-0.11  
(0.90) 
-3.07 *** 
(0.85) 
-4.78 *** 
(1.17) 
-2.45 *** 
(0.76) 
3 Private 
Monitoring 
-8.22 *** 
(2.22) 
0.12  
(0.98) 
-7.45 *** 
(1.73) 
-1.55  
(0.95) 
-1.82  
(1.94) 
-0.11  
(1.22) 
  
Lender, borrower and loan specific 
    
     
4 Lender Log 
(Assets) 
1.43  
(2.78) 
-0.26  
(1.60) 
-2.95 * 
(1.51) 
-4.26 *** 
(1.31) 
-2.86  
(2.07) 
0.01  
(1.57) 
5 Lender 
Leverage 
0.90  
(0.62) 
-1.33  
(0.98) 
-1.24  
(0.91) 
2.28 *** 
(0.87) 
2.30 ** 
(0.91) 
-1.50  
(0.95) 
6 Borrower 
Rating 
-3.04  
(2.19) 
2.36 *** 
(0.48) 
1.60 *** 
(0.36) 
2.15 *** 
(0.53) 
1.41  
(0.91) 
2.40 *** 
(0.50) 
7 Log (Deal 
Amount) 
8.98 *** 
(1.54) 
5.96 *** 
(1.14) 
9.92 *** 
(1.27) 
2.99 *** 
(0.68) 
7.74 *** 
(1.47) 
6.11 *** 
(1.14) 
8 Same Country 22.24 *** 
(5.73) 
-5.11  
(3.62) 
8.57 *** 
(3.10) 
-7.78 * 
(4.50) 
6.48  
(7.08) 
-4.10  
(3.84) 
       
 Borrower Country Specific (except a)     
9 Creditor Rights -4.74 ** 
(2.31) 
-0.38  
(1.09) 
0.01  
(1.28) 
0.81  
(0.97) 
-2.02  
(2.06) 
-0.45  
(0.99) 
10 Creditor Rights 
missing 
-12.49  
(11.20) 
4.00  
(5.41) 
5.52  
(8.84) 
-4.63  
(4.64) 
-4.57  
(11.36) 
2.16  
(5.15) 
11 Log (GDP) -7.35 *** 
(2.23) 
-4.19 *** 
(0.76) 
-5.17 *** 
(1.00) 
-5.10 *** 
(0.93) 
0.52  
(2.22) 
-4.73 *** 
(0.69) 
12 GDP growth -1.53  
(1.16) 
1.87 *** 
(0.51) 
1.47 ** 
(0.62) 
0.76  
(0.53) 
0.11  
(0.65) 
1.63 
***(0.55) 
13 Sovereign 
Credit Risk 
-0.40  
(0.93) 
-3.42 *** 
(0.73) 
-1.35 ** 
(0.53) 
-3.72 *** 
(0.55) 
1.03  
(1.03) 
-3.36 *** 
(0.70) 
14 Lender Country 
Fin. Develop. a 
23.88 * 
(12.55) 
2.74  
(3.94) 
-6.09  
(20.73) 
20.23 *** 
(6.51) 
16.44  
(12.67) 
2.90  
(4.10) 
       
Observations 2,186 39,578 17,180 23,403 3,520 38,306 
R-squared 0.24 0.36 0.37 0.39 0.22 0.36 
+ Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10% 
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Table 9 –Effects on Loan Maturity of Interactions between Bank Regulations, Rule of Law, and 
Competition 
Dependent variable: Log of Maturity. OLS regressions over the period 1998-2006. Robust standard 
errors clustered by banks are in parentheses. Constant, year dummies and other loan-specific controls 
(industry sector, loan purpose and loan type) are omitted. Coefficients and standard errors are 
multiplied by 100. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%; * 10%. 
 
Explanatory Variables R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 
  
Lender Country Specific 
  
1 Capital  -15.22 *** 
(4.76) 
-21.36 *** 
(5.45) 
-7.38 ** 
(3.71) 
-15.28 *** 
(4.04) 
-27.23 *** 
(6.20) 
2 Capital^2 0.85 *** 
(0.32) 
1.14 *** 
(0.29) 
0.89 *** 
(0.32) 
1.47 *** 
(0.32) 
1.14 *** 
(0.29) 
3 Official -2.04 *** 
(0.56) 
-2.19 *** 
(0.59) 
-1.44 ** 
(0.62) 
-1.79 *** 
(0.52) 
-2.00 *** 
(0.57) 
4 Private Monitoring 0.71  
(0.90) 
0.15  
(0.88) 
-7.01 ** 
(3.49) 
-7.80 ** 
(3.24) 
-15.08 *** 
(3.99) 
5 Rule of Law -43.01 *** 
(9.89)  
-47.06 ** 
(20.39)  
-90.61 *** 
(21.06) 
6 Competition 
 
-8.32 ** 
(3.64)  
-8.19 * 
(4.51) 
-16.29 *** 
(6.28) 
7 Capital x  
Rule of Law 
6.26 *** 
(1.72)    
4.65 *** 
(1.54) 
8 Capital x 
Competition 
 1.99 *** 
(0.65)   
1.84 *** 
(0.66) 
9 Priv. Monitoring x 
Rule of Law 
 
 
4.80 ** 
(2.29)  
6.01 *** 
(2.00) 
10 Priv. Monitoring x 
Competition 
 
  
1.39 ** 
(0.56) 
1.07 ** 
(0.51) 
 Lender, borrower and loan specific   
11 Lender Log (Assets) -1.57  
(1.06) 
-4.51 *** 
(1.23) 
-1.61  
(1.10) 
-5.16 *** 
(1.25) 
-4.50 *** 
(1.25) 
12 Lender Leverage -0.88  
(0.76) 
0.25  
(0.65) 
-0.93  
(0.76) 
0.60  
(0.66) 
0.72  
(0.61) 
13 Borrower Rating 2.43 *** 
(0.48) 
2.33 *** 
(0.44) 
2.50 *** 
(0.49) 
2.35 *** 
(0.45) 
2.33 *** 
(0.43) 
14 Log (Deal Amount) 6.30 *** 
(1.09) 
6.05 *** 
(1.12) 
6.42 *** 
(1.08) 
6.15 *** 
(1.14) 
5.93 *** 
(1.14) 
15 Same Country -1.88  
(3.15) 
-0.81  
(3.30) 
-1.89  
(3.17) 
-0.42  
(3.31) 
-1.57  
(3.13) 
 Borrower Country Specific (except a)   
16 Creditor Rights -0.42  
(0.90) 
0.23  
(0.88) 
-0.03  
(0.87) 
0.36  
(0.83) 
-0.17  
(0.81) 
17 Creditor Rights 
missing 
1.41  
(5.06) 
-0.80  
(4.77) 
1.79  
(5.07) 
-0.93  
(4.70) 
0.02  
(4.95) 
18 Log (GDP) -4.54 *** 
(0.76) 
-4.75 *** 
(0.74) 
-4.39 *** 
(0.77) 
-4.79 *** 
(0.75) 
-5.18 *** 
(0.72) 
19 GDP growth 1.59 *** 
(0.48) 
1.48 *** 
(0.48) 
1.60 *** 
(0.48) 
1.60 *** 
(0.48) 
1.55 *** 
(0.46) 
20 Sovereign Credit 
Risk 
-3.04 *** 
(0.57) 
-2.72 *** 
(0.61) 
-2.98 *** 
(0.57) 
-2.70 *** 
(0.62) 
-3.13 *** 
(0.58) 
21 a Lender Country Fin. 
Develop. 
3.65  
(3.65) 
13.43 *** 
(4.49) 
5.36  
(3.92) 
14.09 *** 
(4.23) 
17.38 *** 
(4.39) 
      
Observations 41,965 41,965 41,965 41,965 41,965 
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
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Figure 1 – Effects on Loan Maturity of Interaction between Capital regulations and Rule of Law 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Effects on Loan Maturity of Interaction between Capital regulations and Competition 
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Figure 3 – Effects on Maturity of Interaction between Private Monitoring and Rule of Law 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Effects on Maturity of Interaction between Private Monitoring and Competition 
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